A stochastic model of wildfire ignitions and damages by Heineke, John & Weissenberger, Stein
Santa Clara University
Scholar Commons
Economics Leavey School of Business
1969
A stochastic model of wildfire ignitions and
damages
John Heineke
Santa Clara University, jheineke@scu.edu
Stein Weissenberger
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/econ
Part of the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Leavey School of Business at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact rscroggin@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Heineke, John, and Stein Weissenberger,. "A Stochastic Model of Wildfire Ignitions and Damages." Santa Clara Business Review 5.1
(1974): 1-12.
... 
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A STOCHASTIC MODEL OF WILDFIRE 
IGNITIONS AND DAMAGES 
J. M. Heineke and Stein Weissenberger 
Abstract 
A model of the production of wildfire ignitions and 
damages is developed and used to determine wildland 
activity-regulation decisions whjch minimize total expected 
cost-plus-loss due to wildfires. Tn tlus context, the impli-
cations of various policy decisions are considered. The 
resulting decision rules take a fo rm which makes it possible 
for existing wildfire management agencies to readily adopt 
them upon collection of the required data. 
In troduction 
In one thirteen-day period in 1970, flre burned over a 
half-million acres of wildland in Califorrua. Almost 800 
homes were destroyed, and sixteen lives were lost as a 
direct consequence of this series of wildfires. Costs and 
losses were estimated at over $200 rrullion, not counting 
substantial expected future damage from floods and erosion .1 
Of course, damage of this extent does not often occur 
over such a short period of time. Nonetheless, severe con-
11agra tions occur in California with considerable regularity , 
and although a combination of demographic, topographic, 
and meteorological factors make California 's wildfire prob-
lem especially acute, it is for the most part qualitatively 
similar to the problem confronting public and private 
wildland owners the world over. From a broader perspective, 
the wi ldfire control problem is a portion of the general 
problem of wildland resource management, a problem of 
growing importance due to increasing demands on wildlands 
for both recreational and residential development. 
1Calijomia Aflame 1201. 
£xjsting wildfire control activities may be convenien tly 
categorized as: 
.1. Suppression Activity-Direct control of wildfires, 
following ignition and detection, through the use of men 
and machines. 
2. Pre-suppression Activity-Readiness and deployment 
of suppression and detection resources. 
3. Structure Protection - Reduction of structural loss 
through protection of the individmil structure by the use of 
fire-resistant vege tation and construction materials. 
4 . Fuel Management- Modification of wild land vege tation 
by area-wide or strip ("fuel break") conversion to more 
fire -resistant fuels. Within this class of activities are "pre-
scribed-burn" and " let-burn" policies, which are receiving 
more attention recently with the recognition of the 
constructive role of fire in natural ecosystems. 
5. Ignition Preventio11 Activities- The use of education, 
laws, penalties , inspection, and activity regulation (regulat-
ing the number and kind of users in public wildlands) to 
reduce the number of ignitions generated in the wild lands . 
To our knowledge, under vi rtually all exjsting funding 
arrangements, fire suppression activity receives the over-
whelming portion of the fire con trol budget. Tt is the 
opiluon of many professionals in fire-control orgaruzations 
that, partly as a result of these funding arrangements, there 
is presently a serious neglect of the non-suppression aspects 
of wi ldfire control. It is in part for t his reason that the 
present study was initiated. 
In tlus study we provide a defmitional and conceptual 
framewo rk for putting wildfire prevention management on 
a badly-needed logical foundation. Presently, such manage-
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ment is largely characterized by intuitive judgments and 
ad-hoc decisions.2 Unlike suppression activity, which is 
justified through an implicit argument from "necessity", 
adequate levels of funding for prevention activities will have 
to be justified through careful analysis of associated costs 
and benefits. 
More specifically, in this paper we are concerned with 
the subject of fire control through ignition prevention . 
A model of man-caused ignition generat ion is developed 
which , together with a model for fire damages and decision 
cos ts, can be used to determin e prevention decisions that 
minimize the expected value o f fire prevention costs plus 
fire losses. Although the model can conceptually treat any 
fire-prevention decision, it is applied in detail only to the 
fi re prevention activity of regula ting the number and kind 
of users in a given wild area. Optimal decision rules are 
found and a number of their properties and policy impli-
cations explored. The model can readily treat decisions 
other than ignition prevention , such as fuel modification 
and structure protection measures, permitting an optimi-
za tion to be ultimately performed over a full range of fire-
control decisions. 
IGNITION MODEL 
The block diagram of Figure 1 describes the process of 
fire control, specifically with regard to ignition prevention 
decisions. Decisions, shown ci rcled, fall into two important 
classes. 
I. "Control" decisions 
a. activity control decisions, involving the determina-
tion ofthe number of users, Xi, allowed to engage in activity 
i, i = I , 2, ... , n , denoted collectively by the vector ~.3 A 
user may be an individual, an organization , or simply an 
identifiable activity unit. One user may be engaged in more 
than one activity. Examples of Xi are the number of 
Figure 1 
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2A dramatic exa mple is the exte nsive liter ature o n the use o f ed u-
catio nal (e.g. Smokey the Bear) fire-prevention programs. Written 
almost entirely f ro m a socio-psychologica l point of view, systematic 
and conclusive s tudies from an engineering-economic perspective 
are nearly no n-existent. (See [2 1 I for an extensive biblioj!raphy o f 
such work. For an a nalytical t reatment o f incend iarism, see 1 I 0 ]). 
As another example, in (I 7 I the simple a nd unelaborated advice is 
given that "if the probability o f man -caused fires is high , some 
additiona l resources of the unit prohahly shou ld be d iverted to 
patro l and prevention work." It is the purpose of this study to add 
detai l, clarity , a nd rigor to such prescriptions. 
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campers, off-the-road vehicles, debiis burne rs, children, 
incendiarists, and Joggers (by type of logging activity). 
b. other prevention decisions, including de termination 
of the type of education and fuel modifica tion to be under-
taken and the allocation to each. Also includes the type and 
severity of penalty for incendiary and negligent fire starts 
and the allocation to go into enforcement. These prevention 
J v ecto rs are denoted b y an underbar. 
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decisions are denoted collectively with the vector _g_. 
2. Measurement decisions, involving determination of 
optimal allocation to activities designed to reduce measure-
ment uncertainty. These decisions specify the degree of 
uncertainty to be permitted regarding: 
a. the "true" state of nature represented here by a 
generalized fire danger rating, FDR, which in general_has 
multiple components. The measured fire danger rating FDR, 
is a random variable and will in general differ from the true 
·value. The resulting error will have an associated cost and 
hence some benefit will be associated with error reduction. 
b. the mean number of ignitions by activity,~. Again , 
costs wi ll be· associated with variance in the measured value 
of~,l. 
c. the value of damages and costs. 
The ultimate criterion of system performance is assumed 
to be the expected value of total fire control cost plus 
fire loss (in dollars) and decisions will be taken so as to 
minimize this quantity. It should be noted, however, that the 
physical quantities expected fire damage and the number of 
fires may be in themselves useful measures of system ef-
fectiveness: Certain inefficien t decisions may be discarded 
on this physical basis alone without assigning prices to 
physical damages. 
The ignition model is described schematically in Figure 
2. Its output, the probabili ty of k ignitions in activity i, 
is conditional on the length of the t ime period T (in days) . 
(Time periods of length T in the summer will normally be 
associa ted wi th higher ignition probabilities than periods 
of the same length in the winter); the number of users by 
activity ~;4 the prevent ion state _g ; the ignit ion index I ; the 
specific area m (included in m is the distribution of fine, dead 
ground fue ls in the area and the ignition history of the 
area); and finally, ignition probabilities may depend upon 
the burning index B; and the wind w.S All indices and 
states of nature are initially assumed to be kn own . (See the 
Appendix for the U .S. Forest Service defini tion of the 
indices f and B.) 
Each user in each activity is a potential source of ignit ions 
through the production of fire brands. The occurrence of 
an actual ignition depends on the type of user, the area, the 
point in time, the prevent ion state, and the ignitability of 
fuels, the latter of which is described by the ignition index. 
We assume tha t the jth user in the ith activi ty generates 
Figure 2 
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4The variables Xi will be considered to be continuo us in the sub-
sequen t analysis. 
Sa and W are shown as dashed li nes in Figure 2 because they are 
considered to be of minor influence on most ignition sources. Wind 
will affect t he spread of fire brands and hence may be s ignificant 
only fo r certain kinds of activit ies such as debris burning I 14]. 
3 
.... 
v 
Although the burning index does no t describe ign itability, it is 
probably highly correlated with the generatio n o f incendiary ignitio ns 
( 14) . (Since incendiarists have the explicit objective of starting fires 
of significant size, they tend to take burning conditions into acco unt 
in making ignitions.) Also no te that W and B will effect contagion 
ignit io ns w hich are no t considered ex plicitly as ignitions per se, but 
are implicit in the model of damages below. 
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ignitions according to the Poisson probability law 
(1) 
where P(kij ;I,m,-) is the probability of k ignitions by the jth 
individual in activity i and i\. ij is the mean number of ignit ions 
per day for the jth individ ual in the ith activity .7 
It is important to emphasize the naturalness of assuming 
that kij is Poisson distributed. To this point, recall that two 
major axioms must be fulfilled if ( I ) is to accurately 
represent the number of ignitions by the jth user in activity 
i; First, the number of ignitions in any two non-overlapping 
intervals must be independent. Given the particular user and 
the ignitability of fuels, there would seem to be little 
reason to suspect that the number of ignitions in one period 
in any way inOuences the number in another period .8 The 
second axiom requires that the probability of one ignition 
in a time interval fit be proportional to fit if fit is sufficiently 
small, and that the probabili ty of more than one ignition in 
this period be approximately zero. For the case at hand, this 
requirement is readily satisfied . 
We now assume that the ignition production of any one 
individual is statistically independen t of that of other individ-
uals,but possibly dependent on the total number Xi of individ-
uals in the area , i.e. 
(2) i\. ij ='A ij(Xi,l,m,-) 
with 
(3) P(kijlkrs) = P(kij) , i, r = l ,2, ... ,n 
j = 1 ,2, ... ,Xi 
s = 1 ,2, ... ,Xr 
where krs is the number of ignitions produced by the sth in-
dividual in activity r. The significance of equations (2) and (3) 
is that the expected number of ignitions produced by individ-
ual users may depend on the number of users,but that ignition 
events are statist ically independent from one user to another 
across all activities: There is no direct causal connect ion be-
tween an ignition event of one wildland user and an ignition 
event of any other user.9 For instance, people may become 
more careful with f ire as more people use a given area, from 
the rest raining effect of the surveillance of others; or fire-
brands may be extinguished with grea ter frequency when 
there is a higher density of use.l 0 
6The not ation (") is used to indicate cond it ional variables which are 
not given explicit cit ation, e.g. in (I) kij is conditional not only on 
1 and m but a lso on q, T etc. 
7we assu me ( I ) is stat io nary over the period T , i.e., i\ij(t 1; ·) = 
Aij(t 11 ; ·)for a ll t', t " ET. 
SA possible exception is incendiary activity by pyromaniacs. 
9Again, a possible exception m ight be that past ignition events 
actually trigger ignition generation by pyromaniacs. 
1 0 A more general specification of this re lationship is o btained by 
4 
For a collection of Xi individuals, the total 
number of ignitions in activity i, ki, is the sum of 
the Xi independent random variab les, kij , the 
num be r of ign itions produced by each in-
dividual: 
(4) 
Xi 
ki = :& ki· j=l J 
The probability dist ribution for the sum of independent ran-
dom variables is the convolution of the individual probability 
distributions .! I Since individual igni tions are Poisson distrib-
uted, the distribution of the sum of the kij takes on the 
particularly simple form,l2 
-t..-'\ k· (5) P(ki ;Xi,I ,m ,-) = e 1 ('A iT) 1/(ki)! , ki = 0,1 ,2, ... 
where 
Xj 
(6) 'A i = j ,E1 'Aij(xi,T,m,·) 
(7) = "-i (xi,l ,m ,·) 
is the mean n umber of ignitions per day fo r activity i as a 
function of the number of users of activity i , U1e ignition in-
dex, etc. Note that 'Ai(O,I,m,·) = 0. Th e function 'Ai may be 
estimated from the ignition history by regression analysis. 
On a priori grounds, we make the fo llowing assumptions 
about the function 1\i: 
(10) 'Ai(xi,O,m,·) = 0 and o'Ai/31 > 0 
These assumptions are all obvious ones except perhaps for in-
equality (9), for which there is some evidence. l 3 The follow-
ing special cases are of interest: 
2 2 (11) a 'Ai/c)xi = o , . 
in which case 
'Ai(Xi,l,m,-) = 'Ai0 (I ,m,·)Xi where 3'Ai0 (I,m,-)jaxi = 0 ; and 
writ ing (2) as i\ij = Aij(x,l,m,-): Mean ignit ions in ac tivity by 
individual j depend upon the n u mber of users in a ll act ivities. 
11 See ( 81. p. 248-27 8. 
l 2Jbid, p. 252 . 
13 [ 1 s ] as well as various fire prevention exper ts tend to support 
this view. 
t 
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also t he case in which 
and hence 
2 2 2 2 
a rq/ai = 0 and a r..jfaxi = 0 
The determination ofA i(xi,l,m,.) for these cases is par-
ticularly simple. The function Aio(I,m,-) may be calculated 
from the ignition history of an area simply as 
(13) Aio(I ,m,-) = Ni(I)/Xi(I) 
where Ni(I) is t he tot al number of ignitions due to the jth ac-
tivity for ignition index I and Xi is the total number of user-
days in the ith activity, for ignition index I . Bot h numbers are 
calculated for area m, a particular time period, given manage-
ment policies, and any other parameters that actively affect 
'-i· This procedure will generate a value of"i\i for each value 
of T. The collection of these values is an estimate of the func-
tion Aio(I ,m,} 
Finally, it is important to re -emphasize two of the assump-
tions which underpin the ignition model : 
a. The probability distribution of the numberofignitions 
produced by one user in one activity in time period T 
is independent of the number of ignitions produced by 
any other user in that or any other activity in the same 
time period. 
b. The probability distribution of the number of ignitions 
in any time period T, is independent of the number ob-
served in the preceding period. 
The former assumption rules out phenomena such as pyro -
maniacal activity triggered by other fi res ,as well as in tensifi-
cation of an individual's precautionary activity resulting from 
the observation of fires (the one effect is in a sense the con-
verse of the other; both represent modification of ignition 
generating behavior as a function of observed fires.) The 
latter assumption rules out significant effects of fire history 
onignitability,e.g. the time period Tin the model cannot be 
so long that past ignition events begin to affect future ig-
nition events through changes in the ignitability of fuels. 
FIRE DAMAGE MODEL 
In this section, a model of fire damages is derived from our 
basic model of individual ignition generations. To begin, we 
define the random variable divas the loss associated with the 
vth ignition in activity i. If there happen to be ki ignitions in 
the period, the losses will be denoted di 1, di2, . . . , diki and 
k· 
(14) Siki = ~1 div 
v=l 
5 
is the conditional random variable total losses in activity i 
given ki ignitions. Deletion of the subscript ki on Siki, will be 
used to represent the to tal losses in activity i from a random 
number of ignitions . (That is, the variable Si is not condition-
ed on the number of ignitions .) F inally, we define 
n 
(J 5) S = ~ Si 
i=l 
as the total fire losses across all n activities. We first derive the 
probability dist ribution of Si, fi(Si), using the fact that the 
number of ignitions in activity i, i = 1 ,2, ... ,n, is governed by 
the probability law given by equation (5), and then use (15) 
to obtain needed information about the density of S, f(S). 
In general, the distribution ofloss from the vth ignition in 
activity i is conditioned both by decisions which have been 
made prior to the period and by the "state of nature." In 
particular, we would expect losses to depend primarily upon 
fuel modification decisions, 9_, the burn index, B, and the re-
sources which have been allocated to fire suppression in the 
area in question,~- Symbolically, we denote this dependence 
as Qiv(div;~,B.~,-), where Qiv is the probability densi ty ofdiv· 
l n the analysis that follows it is important that this density 
be independent of time, i.e. stationary over the period T . Tn 
this period, the major influence of time will be changes in 
"burnability" which are induced by weather changes. Since 
these influences on Qiv are "picked up" by the burn index, 
stationarity over T seems to be an acceptable assumption. 
If we call hi(S; lki) the conditional density of total loss in 
activity i given that there are ki ignitions, then the density of 
total losses in activity i is 
This density is the product of the probability ki ignitions will 
occur with the density function of total losses given ki igni-
tions, summed over all ki ignitions. The function hi(Si I ki) is 
readily deducible from the distributions of individual ignition 
losses, Qiv(div;q,B,R,.). In particular, hi(Si lki) is the ki fold 
convolution ofQiv-with itself.l4 
Since the objective of wildland management decision 
making has been taken to be minimization of expected cost 
plus loss, we are especially interested in the mean of the dis-
tribution given in (16). Notice that E(Sj) is a function not 
only of the "state of nature" as given by I, B, the distribution 
of fuels, etc., but also of the values of the decision variables 
Xj,9_, and g. Since expected cost plus loss depends explicitly 
on these decision vatiables in the model we have formulated, 
it should be possible to detive the ir optimal values fo r various 
"states of nature." 
The mean loss in activity i is by definition 
14see 18] or 14 1. 
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where 
(18) f~ Sihi (Silki)dSi = E(Si lki) 
ki 
= L E(div) 
v=l 
Mean losses in activity i are then 
00 ki -t--T k" (19) E(S) = L L [e 1 (t-iT) 1/ (ki)!] E(div), 1 =1 ,2, .. .n 
ki=O v=1 
and from ( 15) the expected total loss over all n activities is 
given by 
n oo ki t-·T k" 
(20) E(S) = L L L E(div)e- 1 (XiT) 1/ (ki)! 
i=l ki=O v=1 
Since the objective of wildland management was assumed 
to be minimization of the expected tota l loss plus cost, ex-
pression (20) is the fundamental quantity in the derivation 
of decision rules that satisfy this objective. Although (20)pre-
sents no difficulties from the point of view of analytic tracta-
bility, the implied optimal decision rules are extremely un-
wieldly and suffer somewhat from lack of straightforward 
interpretation. This sit uation can be greatly improved by 
assuming that the variables div, v = 1 ,2, ... ,ki are identically 
distributed. That is, in a giJ1en area and in a given activity 
losses from individual ignitions obey the same probability 
law. This would seem to be a reasonable assumption and 
allows equation (20) to be expressed as 
n 
(21) E(S)=T L '-iE(di) 
i=1 
where E(ki) = '- iT and E(di1) = E(di2) = ... = E(div) 
= E(di).l5 In words, the total expected loss over the period 
of length Tis the expected number of ignitions in activity i, 
times the expected loss per ignition in activity i, summed over 
all activities. This surprisingly simple result depends upon no 
assumption about the distribution of losses from a single ig-
nition, Qiv(div;g_,B,~,.), and is most attractive from a decision 
analytic point of view. As we have noted , the Poisson para-
meter associated with activity i is a function of a number of 
I SAs long as areas are relatively ho mogeneous, this assumption will 
hold. But, if T were chosen long enough so that areas co uld become 
heterogeneous w ith respect to, say, fuels, then the assumption of 
identica lly distributed losses will not be va lid. For example, over 
long periods of time, the incidence of fires in an area will create 
dramat ic differences in the distribution of fue ls and hence w ill imply 
different loss densities within an area. The way out of this problem 
is to choose T short enough to eliminate these effects. Of course, in 
principle, if an area beco mes heterogeneous, one need only break it 
up in to homogeneous sub areas . See [ 9 ] for a model which yields 
essent iall y the same resu lt as reported in equation (2 1). 
6 
decisions including entry control, education, 
penalty and fuel modification decisions and the 
"state of nature." Likewise, E(div) depends upon 
suppression activity, fuel modification decisions and the 
"burn index. The simple functional form of expected losses 
given in (21) makes the decision opt imization problem especi-
ally easy to solve. 
Recall that fire losses depend upon the state of prevention 
activities, the burn index, the level of suppression, etc., in 
which case expected total losses, equation (21 ), for the pe-
riod Tare 
n 
(22) E(S) = T L J.Li(g_,B,g,.)t- i(Xj,I,m,.) 
i=1 
where 
Equation (22) is the basis for the optimization of preven-
tion decisions.ln what follows, we will concentrate on those 
prevention decisions which affect Xi . 
REGULATION ENTRY INTO AND 
USE OF A WILDLAND AREA 
Denote the number of people excluded from activity i by 
Yi· Then the cost c(.l'_) of excluding Yi people in activi ty i, 
= 1 ,2, ... ,n is given by 
n n n 
(24) c(V = L ai(Yi,T,-) + L bi(Yi,T,-) = .L Ci(Yi,T,-) 
i=l i=l 1=1 
where ai(Yi,T,.) is the opportunity cost of excluding Yi people 
in period T from the ith activityl6 and bi(Yi,T,.) is the ad-
ministrative cost of the same exclusinn. We now make several 
plausible assumptions regarding the forms of these cost func-
tions: that marginal opportunity costs are constant in the 
number of users and that marginal administrative costs are 
non-increasing in the number of users. That is 
and 
Note that (25) and (26) imply that 
(27) a2 c/al ,;;;;o,i = 1,2, ... n. 
The total expected cost-plus-loss entailed in a decision to 
permit activity by Xi people is then given by 
16The o pportunity cost of excluding the jth ind ividual from activity 
i is defined as the amount individual j would pay to be able to use 
the wild area in question for activity i. 
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n n 
(28) cf>·(i) = ~ cf>j(xi) = E(c+S) = ~ (Ci(Zi-Xi ,T,.)+TJ.Ii\S,B ,~,.)~q(xi,l,m,-)) 
i=l i=l 
The decision rule given as equation (3 1) 
is illustrated schematically in Figure 3. 
where Zi is the demand for the i th activity and Yi = Zi - Xi. The 
problem is then to 
(29) minimize cf> (~ 
X 
subject to the constraints 
O ~x<z 
The special structure of cf> (~ considerably simplifies the 
solution of (29). Tn particular, from equations (9) and (27), 
and cf> (f) is convex in ~.1 7 Consequently, there are no local 
interior solutions to (29).18 Using Xio to represent the opti-
mal admission decision in activity i, we have 
(31) XiO={O 
Zi 
if 
if 
[1/>i(O)- cf>i(zi)] < 0 
[1/>i(O) - cf>j(zi)] > 0 
Note that the rule is always of an all or 
nothing sort: either everyone is permitted entry to activity 
i or no one is and that the decision criterion is based simp-
ly on the difference between the cost of total exclusion and 
total admission. These simple results depend crucially on the 
convexity properties of the functions Ci and Xi. If these prop-
erties are not satisfied, then the appropriate decision rule may 
be the one that requires an 0 < XiO < Zi and only partial sat-
isfaction of demand occurs. 
An examination of the decision rule (3 1) also reveals the 
following interesting features: 
i) For sufficiently small T, demand is satisfied for the ith 
activity, independent of the magnitude of other para-
meters.l9 This result follows from the fact that 
Aj (Zi, 0, ·) = 0. 
ii) The converse (that no activity be permitted for suffi-
ciently large I) is not necessarily true. There may be 
conditions under which demand should be satisfied 
for all parameter values. Specifically, this is true if 
cf>j (0) > cf>j (zi) 
Figure 3 
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18This state ment is not precisely correct. If c/>
1(x) = 0 for a ll x, every 
value of x minimizes cf>. This case is of little intereSt and will be igno red 
henceforth. 
19This result also ho lds fo r sufficiently small B, independent o f all 
other parameters if J.li (~, 0, ~,.) = 0. 
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for all _g_, B, ~. ·, etc. That is, the expected damage due 
to full activity never exceeds the costs of complete ex-
clusion. 
A special, but practically important, case of the decision 
ru le given in (31) occurs when cost functions have the follow-
ing properties: 
aCi/ OYi = Cio T and oCj/oT = CioYi , 
where 
acio/OYi = aci0 /oT = 0; and 
oA.ifoxi = "-io where oA. io/OXi = 0 . 
Marginal costs with respect to the number of individuals ex-
cluded and the length of the decision period are constant and 
losses per unit time are linear in the number of users. The de-
cision rule (3 1) then becomes 
0 if Cio <J..LiC9.. B, R, ·)"-io(l,m,-) 
(31) Xio = 
100 
>< 
w 
0 
2:: 
z 
0 
E 
z 
s 
...: 
0 
Zi if Cio > J..LiC9.. B, ~. ·)"-io(l,m,-) 
Figw-e 4 
DECISION RULE FOR THE jth ACTIVITY 
Cio 
I = --B-1 
/Jioai 
(CONSTANT MARGINAL COST, AND 
CONSTANT MARGINAL IGNITION GENERATION) 
c;0 =COST PER USER EXCLUDED 
Jlio = DAMAGE PER FIRE PER 
UNIT BURN INDEX 
a ; = MEAN NUMBER OF FIRES PER 
USER-DAY PER UNIT 
IGNITION INDEX 
EXCLUSION 
ENTRANCE 
B, BURNING INDEX 100 
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Note that the rule given as equation (32) does not require 
knowledge of the demand for any activity and is time in-
variant. It is illustrated in Figure 4 for the case where 
A. io(T, m, ·) = ai(m , ·)T and /Ji(g_, B, ~. ·) = /Jio(s_, ~. ·)B. 
Tn this case the decision rule is 
0 if l > (cio/JJioai)B- 1 
(33) Xio = 
Xi if l < (cio/JJioai)B-1 
This formulation is particularly easy to use in practice in that 
once Cio, /Jio and "-io have been estimated, one needs only the 
value of the ignition and burn indices to reach a decision. 
Note that in this and in previous cases both Band I must be 
considered in making activity regulation decisions. Current 
practice appears to base such decisions on the value of the 
burning index B alone, which is reasonable to the extent that 
B and 1 are closely correlated . However, to the degree that 
they differ (due for example to wind, topography, or heavy 
fuel effects), errors will be introduced into decisions. 
The decision rule (33) may be re-formulated in a useful 
and interesting fashion. To this end , define the "risk" in acti-
vityi , ri , as 
(34) ri = J.lioai/Cio , 
and the "Fire Load Index" as 
(35) Fi = q TB. 
The index Fi has precisely the same form as that recommend-
ed in the U.S. Forest Service Fire Danger Rating (FOR) Sys-
tem [ 17 J ; however, here " risk" has been given a new defini-
tion by including the effects of costs and damages. These new 
definitions of risk and the Fire Load Index also differ from 
the existing ones of the FDR by being computed for each of 
the various activities.20 
In terms of the new index Fi , equation (35), the decision 
rule (33) has the simple form 
0 if Fi > 1 
(36) Xio = 
The Fire Load Index Fi is dimensionless and is merely the 
cost-benefit ratio 
expected $ cost + loss per day from admission to 
activity i Fi= ~--------~--~~~~--~~----~~ $ cost per user day from exclusion from activity i 
20The term r;l is analogous to the "Occurre nce Index" of the FDR-
(See t he Appendix fo r more detail.) 
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Obviously, if Fi > 1 entry for purposes of using 
activity i should be prohibited and Fi < 1 implies 
all in terested parties should be allowed to use the 
area for activity i . Note that the index Fi has precise 
significance only for activity regulation. For other 
fire prevention decisions, e .g. various types of fuel 
modification, a procedure iden tical to that we have 
followed will yield an index appropriate to the de-
cision in question. 
The increased cost of the decision given by (38) over the basic optimal 
decision rule (31) is readily found to be 
n n 
(39) ~</> = ~E(c+S) =min { L Ci(Zi,T), T L J..Li(g,B,g,.)A.j(Zi,I,m, -)} 
i=l i=l 
It should be emphasized that use of the Fire Load 
Index Fi in place of the more general test given by 
equation (3l),is justified only to the extent that the 
following approximations are valid: 
i) The mean number of fires per user day per unit ignition 
index in activity i is constant in Xi and I. ( oA.ifo Xi= con-
stant; oA. i/oi =constant) 
ii) The mean $cost-plus-loss per fire per unit burning in-
dex in activity i is constant in B. (OJ..Li/oB =constant) 
iii) The cost of prohibiting activity i per user day (adminis-
trative plus opportunity costs) is constant in Xi. (oCj/OXi 
= constant) 
ENTRY AND USE CONTROL UNDER 
HOMOGENEITY CONSTRAINT 
Next, we consider a modification of the decision problem 
to account for a policy which prohibits the exclusion of 
specific users. For example , it is a USFS policy tha t all users 
be treated " the same" in the sense that, 
"Closures and restrictions ... should be applied 
equally to all forest users, and not to any one category 
of visitors,such as hunter , hiker, fisherman, or logger." 
[1 8] . 
This policy can be interpreted as implying the following con-
straints on decisions: 
If condition (37) is added as a constraint on the decision 
problem posed in (29), the optimal decision rule is 
n 
0 , i = 1, 2, ... , n, if L [tf>i(O)- tf>i(zi)] < 0 
i=I 
n 
Zi , i = 1, 2, ... ,n, if L [t/>i(O)- t/>i(Zi)] >022 
i=l 
21 More generally, these constraints might apply o nly to a subset of 
the n activities. 
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n 
- _L min { Ci (Zi, T) , TJ..Li (g_,B ,~, ·)Ai (zi,I,m, ·)} 
1=1 
The cost of the policy given by (37) will be positive unless 
decisions under rules (31) and (38) happen to agree, i.e. un-
less the basic decision rule (3 I) says either prohibit all n activ-
ities or permit all n activities (the latter event will occur for 
sufficiently low fire danger, although the former will not 
necessarily occur for sufficiently high fire danger. Since the 
additional cost may be significant ly large, such policies should 
be carefully examined. 
For the case where expected cost and loss may be collapsed 
into the index Fi (see (36)) decision rule (38) may be written 
as 
n n 
0 if ·r > [ L Ciol L J..Lioai] B -1 
i=l i=l 
(40) 
n n 
Zi if I < [ L Ciol L J..Lioai] B- 1 
i=l i=1 
This decision rule suggests the following definitions: Let 
"overall risk," r, be defined as 
n n 
(41) r = L J..Lioaif L Cio23 
i=1 i=1 
and the "overall" Fire Load Index, F, as 
(42) F = riB 
Then, the decision rule (40) becomes 
1
0 ifF> 1, i = I, 2, ... , n , 
(43) xio = 
Zj if F < 1, i = I , 2, . . . , n , 
ENTRY AND USE CONTROL UNDER 
BUDGETARY CONSTRAINT 
Let us consider now the more realistic situation where the 
fire protection agency o perates under budgetary constraints. 
22This result follows f rom setting x = ~z and minim izing </>({3)subject 
to the constraint 0 ~~ ~ 1. - -
n 
2 3Note that in general r -=F L r;. 
i= J 
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We consider for simplicity the linear case whose uncon-
strained solution is given by (36). Let the total maximum ad-
ministrative budget available for activity regulation during 
a time period T be given by bT, where b is a positive 
constant. Then the basic cost minimization problem (29) is 
modified simply by the addition of one more constraint on 
the activity vectorS this constraint can be written as the in-
equality 
(44) b 'x - d0 ;;:. 0 , 
- 0 -
where b = [b0 1 , b0 2, ... , b0 n] is a vector of (constant) 
- 0 
administrative costs of activity exclusion per user day, and 
d0 =b 'z - b is the difference per day between the adminis-
- o -
trative costs of total exclusion and the total available budget. 
Clearly, if d0 .;;;; 0, the available administrative resource is 
sufficient to exclude all users in all activities, and the previous 
unconstrained solution (36) remains valid. Assume then that 
d0 >O. 
as 
We can rewrite the basic cost minimization problem (29) 
minimize 1/J (~ 
X (45) 
subject to the constraints~;;:.~;;:. 0 
To simplify the statement of the solution of ( 45), let us also 
rewrite the (linear) cost function 1/J as 
1/J (~ = T 5:_0 '!:.. + T _g_'~ 
where _g_' = [Cl o(F I - l),C2o(F2- 1), . . . ,cn0 (Fn- 1)] 
is a vector of total net cost per user day in each activity. 
This problem is a standard linear programming problem, 
but of such simple structure that the following elementary 
algorithm readily produces its solution: 
1. Take~=~· which always satisfies the constraints. 
2. Label activities so that gi ;;:. gi+ 1 for all i. Let Fi;;:. 
and, consequently, gi;;:. 0 fori= I , 2, . .. , k ..;;n;let 
Fi < 1 for i > k. Then, keep Xi= Zi fork <i ..;;n, and 
subsequently, consider only i = I, 2, . .. , k. Starting 
with XJ, 
3. decrease Xi until either 
4. Xi = 0 , in which case repeat step 3 for Xi+ 1, until i + 1 
= k, or 
5 . b 'x - d0 = 0, in which case the process is terminated. 
- 0-
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ln general, ifthe process terminates in step 5 with the budget 
equality satisfied, there will be some activity Q, 1 .;;;; Q.;;;; k,for 
which demand will be partially satisfied,i.e. with 0 <xQ< ZQ. 
There wi ll thus be at most one activity with 0 < XQ < ZQ; in 
all other activities either Xi = 0 or Xi = zj, that is, either all 
other users are either totally excluded or permitted full use. 
ln the situation where the optimal decision requires use of 
the entire budget, it is of interest to determine the sensitivity 
of net costs to increases in the budget allotment, i.e. to de-
termine the shadow price of the budget resource. (The shadow 
price is the value of an extra unit of resource, the dollar 
amount by which total cost will be decreased through the ex-
penditure of an additional dollar of budget. In the situation 
where the optimal solution does not require the whole budget, 
clearly the shadow price of the budget will be zero.) Consider 
the cas~ of partial regulation where the optimal decision re-
quires 0 < XQ < ZQ for some l .;;;; Q .;;;; k.;;;; n. Then, a simple 
calculation shows that the shadow price ofb, ai/J* /ab, is given 
by 
(46) ai/J*/ab = - cQo(FQ - I)/bQ 
where 1/J* is the optimal cost. 
ERROR SENSITIVlTY 
It is of considerable interest to determine the effects of 
various uncertainties and measurement errors on the optimal 
decision rules which were derived above. 1n this section we 
assess the effect of errors in measuring the Fire Load Index, 
Fi_24 To this end, let Fi be the measured value of Fi . The 
measurement error t.Fi is then given by 
Examination of the optimal decision rule (36) shows that a 
decision error will be made whenever 
>I and Fi < 1 
(48) Fi 
< 1 and Fi > 1 
A simple calculation further shows tha t the error cost M>i 
(the cost associated with an erroneous decision) is given by 
(49) M>i = CioZiTI I - Fil. 
The error costs (49) occur only for values of Fi and Fi, which 
satisfy (48). To interpret these results, suppose that measure-
ment errors are bounded by €i, i.e. 
24Recall that "costs and losses" may be collapsed into Fi when mar-
ginal costs with respect to the nurr:ber of individuals excluded and the 
length of the decision period are constant and losses per unit time are 
linear in the number of users. 
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Then, from (48) and (49) we have that 
{
CioZiT€i for I J - Fi 1,;; Ei 
max !:::.1/>i. = 
0 for I I - Fi I> Ei 
where max !:::.1/>i. is the maximum cost associated with a 
measurement error in Fi and therefore 
M>i ,;; max f:::.</>i 
Hence, the optimal decision rule (36) has two desirable prop-
erties with respect to measurement errors in Fi : (1) Maximum 
error costs may be made arbitralily small by making measure-
ments sufficiently accurate; and (2) error costs are zero for 
sufficiently large Fi. Thus, relatively inaccurate measure-
ments may give satisfactory results for the conditions of 
most interest (high fire danger). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have examined the logical framework of 
a class of decisions confronting fire protection agencies using 
expected cost plus fire loss as the measure of system per-
formance. More specifically, we analyzed fire prevention de-
cisions under the "cost plus loss" criterion. The decision 
problem was formulated for an arbitrary prevention activity 
and then solved for a particular activity, controlling entry 
into and use of a wild area. Optimal decision rules were 
presented under a number of different assumptions about 
system parameters and several types of institutionally im-
posed constraints. Since system parameters are a function 
not only of the number of users by activity but also of the 
level of all other prevention activities, the same basic pro-
cedure we have used will generate optimal decision rules for 
any other prevention activity. 
It should be emphasized that the optimal prevention 
decision rules presented here are solutions to a sub-optimi-
zation within the overall fire-control decision problem and 
hence no inferences are possible from our analysis concern-
ing the redishibution of wildfire management resources 
between fire suppression activity and fire prevention activity. 
Almost certainly optimal wildfire management will involve 
a mixture of fire suppression and fire prevention activities, 
with the specific mixture depending upon a number of local 
characteristics of the area protected. Determination of the 
activity mix and its dependence upon these characteristics is 
considerably beyond the scope of the present study. Quite 
obviously, the central concept in such a determination is the 
shadow price of resources in fire su ppression activities vis a 
vis their shadow price in fire prevention activities. 
Use of the ideas presented here as a basis for making entry 
and use decisions, of course, awaits verification of the model. 
And as is often the case, the major problem encountered in 
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any attempt to test (and, for that matter, use) a model lies 
in the quality and quantity of available data. In particular, 
data is needed by area on the number of users by activity, the 
number of ignitions and the ignition index for given areas and 
given time intervals. This information would al low estimation 
of the functions Xi via regression analysis. In addition, data 
on fire losses (by area) as a function of the level of prevention 
and suppression activities and the burn index would besuf-
ficient for estimation of the functions 11i· Finally, informa-
t ion is needed on the cost of administeling an entry and use 
control program (for estimating the functions bi) and on the 
opportunity costs of excluding people from wild areas (for 
estimation of the functions ai). There would seem to be no 
inherent difficulty in collecting data on these variables with 
the possible exception of the fire damage and "opportuni ty 
cost" categolies.25 
The basic problem in estimating the opportunity cost of 
exclusion or the value of an area burned is essentially the 
same: Public wildland use (by activity) is for the most part 
not market priced and hence observations on prices and vol-
umes needed to estimate the relevant functions (demand func-
tions) do not exist.26 In these cases, proxy variables for 
market transactions are used as an ind irect means of deter-
mining the appropriate values. See [ J , 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11 , 12 , 
16, 20] for examples of this procedure. Since examples are 
plentiful, we pursue the point no furt her. 
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APPENDIX 
Fire Danger Rating System 
Use is made t hroughout the paper of certain measures of 
ignition and burning properties of vegetative fuels; we 
briefly describe these measures here. Extensive details may 
be found in [17). 
The National Fire Dange r Rating System was recently 
proposed to provide a uniform national system for measur-
ing the state of vegetation vis a vis expected wildfire inci-
dence and severity. We make use of the following com-
ponents of this system here: The ignition index f ("ignition 
component" in f1 7]) "is a measure of the ease with which 
fuels may be ignited. It is function of the percentage of fine 
fuels which are living, the moisture content of the dead 
portion , and the fuel temperature. The burning index B is 
intended as a measure of the "potential amoun t of effort 
needed to contain a fire in a particular fuel type within a 
rating area." Specifically, it estimates the flame length 
based on a model of fuel distribution, and is a measure of 
the rate of fire spread. lt is a function of fuel type, fuel 
moisture, win dspeed, slope and temperature. Risk r is not 
well defined, but is meant to be proportional to the expected 
number of fires during a given period of time. The oc-
currence index is proportional to the product rl , and is 
considered to be " related to the potential fire incidence 
within a rating area." The fire load index F is proportional 
to the product rm and is considered to be "related to the 
total amount of effort required to contain all probable fires 
occurring within a rating area during a specific period." 
